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Attaining Fairness in Communication for
Omniscience
Ni Ding, Member, IEEE, Parastoo Sadeghi, Senior Member, IEEE, David Smith, Member, IEEE, and
Thierry Rakotoarivelo, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper studies how to attain fairness in com-
munication for omniscience, where a set of users exchange their
observations of a discrete multiple random source to attain
omniscience—the state that all users recover the entire source.
The optimal rate region containing all source coding rate vectors
that achieve the omniscience with the minimum sum rate is
shown to coincide with the core (the solution set) of a coalitional
game. Two game-theoretic fairness solutions are studied: the
Shapley value and the egalitarian solution. It is shown that the
Shapley value assigns each user the source coding rate measured
by his/her remaining information of the multiple source given
the common randomness that is shared by all users, while
the egalitarian solution simply distributes the rates as evenly
as possible in the core. To avoid the exponentially growing
complexity of obtaining the Shapley value, a polynomial-time
approximation method is proposed by utilizing the fact that
the Shapley value is the mean value over all extreme points
in the core. In addition, a steepest descent algorithm is proposed
which converges in polynomial time to the fractional egalitarian
solution in the core that can be implemented by network coding
schemes. Finally, it is shown that the game can be decomposed
into subgames so that both the Shapley value and the egalitarian
solution can be obtained within each subgame in a distributed
manner with reduced complexity.
Index Terms—Coalitional game, communication for omni-
science, fairness, submodularity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The communication for omniscience (CO) problem is for-
mulated in [5]. It is assumed that there are a finite number
of users in a system that are indexed by the set V . Each
user i ∈ V observes a distinct component Zi of a discrete
multiple random source ZV = (Zi : i ∈ V ) in private. The
users are allowed to exchange their observations over public
authenticated broadcast channels so as to attain omniscience,
the state where each user recovers the observation sequence of
the entire source ZV . Originally, the CO problem was studied
in [5] due to its dual relationship with the multi-terminal
secret capacity [5, Theorem 1]. More recently, the system
model was also cast into the coded cooperative data exchange
(CCDE) problem [6]–[8] in which the users are mobile clients
broadcasting linear combinations of packets over noiseless
peer-to-peer (P2P) wireless channels and the communication
rates are restricted to be integral.
Some initial results of this paper have been published in [1]–[4].
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One main optimization problem that arises in CO is how to
minimize the overall source coding rate to attain omniscience.
We call it the minimum sum-rate problem and denote the
value of the minimum sum-rate by R∗. By utilizing sub-
modular function minimization (SFM) techniques, the value
of R∗, as well as an optimal rate vector are determined in
O(|V |2 ·SFM(|V |) time in [9] for the asymptotic model where
the communication rates are real-valued.1 Here, SFM(|V |)
is the complexity of a SFM algorithm and is polynomial
[10, Chapter VI]. For solving the minimum sum-rate problem
in CCDE, the authors in [11], [12] proposed deterministic
algorithms, which also complete in O(|V |2 · SFM(|V |)) time.
In addition, the algorithm proposed in [13] determines the
minimum sum-rate in CCDE more efficiently by simulating
the communications based on the random linear network
coding scheme [14], [15].
While existing algorithms in [9], [11]–[13] only determine
one optimal rate vector, it is shown in [9, Section III-B] that
the optimal rate region is not a singleton in general. So, it
is natural to consider how to choose an optimal rate vector
that also attains fairness, in particular when the intention is
to promote the mobile clients’ cooperation in CCDE or even
out the battery usage in a wireless sensor network (WSN).
The problem of how to attain fairness has been previously
considered in [16], [17] for CCDE. In [17], a multi-layer
acyclic graph is proposed, based on which, a constrained
quadratic programming is formulated to determine the Jain’s
fairness solution [18]. The algorithm proposed in [16] is
a greedy approach, where, in each iteration, a unit rate is
assigned to the user that optimizes a fairness measure, so
that the resulting solution converges to a fair and integer-
valued optimal rate vector. In fact, these two methods both
aim at determining the integral egalitarian solution in the
optimal rate region.2 However, neither of them applies to
systems where the communication rates are non-integral, e.g.,
the asymptotic model or where packet splitting (and hence
fractional transmission rates) is allowed in CCDE.
The main purpose of this paper is to study how to attain
1In an asymptotic model, the observation sequence is assumed to be
infinitely long. The CCDE corresponds to the finite linear source model, an
example of the non-asymptotic model. In the non-asymptotic model, each
user only obtains a finite length of observations and the broadcasts are integer
number of linear combinations of observations [9, Section II].
2The fair solutions in [16], [17] coincide with the egalitarian solution [19] in
coalitional game theory due to the equivalence between the submodular base
polyhedron and the optimal rate region [9, Section III-B], both of which,
as will be shown in Section III in this paper, coincide with the core of a
coalitional game.
2fairness in the optimal rate region for the CO problem, where
the broadcast rates are not constrained to be integer-valued. We
start the study by showing the equivalence between the optimal
rate region and the core (the solution set) of a coalitional game.
It is shown that the game formulates the multi-terminal source
coding problem for attaining the omniscience of multiple
source ZV by the minimum sum-rate R
∗. We then consider
two fair solutions proposed in coalitional game theory: the
Shapley value [20] and the egalitarian solution [19]. The Shap-
ley value assigns each user the expected marginal remaining
randomness given the common information shared by all users,
whereas the egalitarian solution simply tries to even out the
source coding rates in the optimal region. To alleviate the
exponentially growing complexity of obtaining the Shapley
value with problem size, we show how to approximate it in
polynomial time. We also propose a steepest descent algorithm
(SDA) for searching a fractional egalitarian solution that can
be implemented by packet splitting in CCDE. Finally, we show
that the game can be decomposed by the fundamental partition
P∗ into subgames,3 each of which can attain fairness, either
being the Shapley value or the egalitarian solution, on its own.
This decomposition leads to a distributed computation method
for attaining fairness and also reduces the complexity.
A. Summary of Main Results
Our main results are summarized as follows:
1) We formulate the problem of attaining the omniscience
with the minimum sum-rate R∗ by a coalitional game model,
where the characteristic cost function fˆR∗(X) for all X ⊆ V
quantifies the remaining randomness in ZX given the common
randomness Λ = H(V )−R∗ that is shared by all users in V .4
Since fˆR∗ specifies the source coding rate/cost upper bound
to each user subset X ⊆ V , we show that (a) the core of the
game coincides with the optimal rate region containing all the
solutions to the minimum sum-rate problem and (b) the game
describes the users’ cooperation when they jointly encode the
remaining randomness in ZV to reach the omniscience with
the sum-rate exactly equal to R∗.
2) Based on the game model, we introduce the first fairness
solution, the Shapley value [20]. We show that the Shapley
value assigns each user the expected marginal cost fˆR∗(X ∪
{i})− fˆR∗(X) over all X ⊆ V \ {i}. This solution is fair in
that it penalizes each user according to the source coding rate
he/she incurred in CO. While the complexity of obtaining the
exact Shapley value is exponentially growing in |V |, we show
that the Shapley value is the mean over all extreme points in
the core. By randomly generating an extreme point set of a
desired size, we are able to obtain an approximation of the
Shapley value in polynomial time.
3) The egalitarian solution [19] aims to equalize the rate/cost
allocation in the optimal rate region regardless of the marginal
3The fundamental partition P∗ is an optimizer that determines the minimum
sum-rate R∗ [9]. See also Section II-A.
4The game model is closely related to the dual relationship [5], [21,
Theorem 1]: R∗ = H(V ) − Λ, where H(V ) is the entropy of ZV and
Λ is the common randomness that is shared by all the users in V [22], [23].
The interpretation is that attaining omniscience by the minimum sum-rate
R∗ is equivalent to determining how to let the users encode the remaining
randomness in ZV given the common randomness Λ.
costs. This solution is more suitable for those systems with
equally privileged users, e.g., CCDE and WSN. While there
exist polynomial-time algorithms in the literature, e.g., [24],
[25], that determine a real-valued egalitarian solution, we
propose a steepest descent algorithm (SDA) for searching
a fractional egalitarian solution that can be implemented in
CCDE by splitting each packet into |P∗|−1 chunks. Based on
an optimality criterion for the egalitarian solution stating that
the local optimum implies the global optimum, we show that
the estimation sequence generated by the SDA converges to the
fractional egalitarian solution in O(|P∗|·L(V )·|V |·SFM(|V |))
time, where L(V ) is the maximum ℓ1-norm over all pairs of
points in the optimal rate region. In addition, the steepest
direction in each iteration of SDA can be computed in a
distributed manner.
4) We show that the coalitional game model can be decom-
posed by the fundamental partition P∗: the users in each subset
C ∈ P∗ form a subgame with the characteristic cost function
fˆR∗(X) for all X ⊆ C. This decomposition is due to the
mutual independence between ZC and ZC′ for any two distinct
subsets C,C′ ∈ P∗ given the common randomness Λ. For
attaining fairness in the optimal rate region, it suffices to let the
users within each subgame C ∈ P∗ decide how to allocate the
source coding rates fairly. This allows a decomposition method
to reach fair solutions: the fusion of the Shapley values and the
egalitarian solutions over all subgames constructs the Shapley
value and the egalitarian solution, respectively, of the entire
game, which not only reduces complexity, but also allows
parallel computation.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is described in Section II, where we also review existing
results on the minimum sum-rate problem. In Section III, we
formulate the coalitional game model and show that it can be
decomposed by the fundamental partition P∗. In Section IV,
we show how to attain fairness in the optimal rate region
by the Shapley value and discuss how to approximate it to
avoid the exponentially growing complexity. In Section V,
we propose the SDA algorithm for searching the fractional
egalitarian solution. In both Sections IV and V, we also present
methods to obtain the Shapley value and egalitarian solution
by the decomposition method.
II. COMMUNICATION FOR OMNISCIENCE
Let V with |V | > 1 be a finite set that indexes the terminals
in a discrete memoryless multiple source ZV = (Zi : i ∈ V ).
Each component Zi is a discrete random variable that takes
its values in the finite alphabet Zi according to the joint
probability mass function PZV . Let there be |V | users. Each
user i ∈ V observes an i.i.d. n-sequence Zni of the component
Zi in private. The users are allowed to exchange compressed
versions of their observations over noiseless broadcast chan-
nels. The purpose is to attain omniscience, the state where all
3users recover the observation sequence ZnV . This problem is
called communication for omniscience (CO) [5].5
A. Minimum Sum-rate and Optimal Rate Region
For X ⊆ V , let H(X) be the amount of randomness in
ZX measured by Shannon entropy [26]. For a (source coding)
rate vector rV = (ri : i ∈ V ), each dimension ri denotes
the code rate at which user i encodes his/her observation Zni .
Let r : 2V 7→ R+ be the sum-rate function associated with rV
such that
r(X) =
∑
i∈X
ri, ∀X ⊆ V,
with the convention r(∅) = 0. Here, r(X) denotes the rates
at which the users in X jointly encode ZnX . A source coding
rate vector rV at which omniscience is attainable satisfies the
Slepian-Wolf (SW) constraints r(X) ≥ H(X |V \X), ∀X ( V
[5]. The achievable rate region is
R(V ) = {rV ∈ R
|V | : r(X) ≥ H(X |V \X), ∀X ( V }. (1)
The fundamental problem concerning the efficiency in CO
is to minimize the sum-rate for attaining omniscience
R∗ = min{r(V ) : rV ∈ R(V )}. (2)
This minimum sum-rate problem has been studied and solved
efficiently in [9], [27] without dealing with the exponentially
large number of constraints in the linear programming (2). We
review some results in [9] as follows. They will be used in
Section III to formulate the game model.
For sum-rate α ∈ R+, define
fα(X) =
{
0 X = ∅
α−H(V \X |X) X 6= ∅
.
Let Π(V ) be the set containing all partitions of V . The Dil-
worth truncation of fα is fˆα(X) = minP∈Π(X)
∑
C∈P fα(C)
for all X ⊆ V [28]. It is shown in [9, Theorem 4 and Corollary
46] that
R∗ = min{α : fα(V ) = fˆα(V )}. (3)
The optimal rate region R∗(V ) that contains all achievable
rate vectors rV with sum-rate r(V ) = R
∗ coincides with
B(fˆR∗), the base polyhedron of fˆR∗ [10, Section 2.3] [29,
Definition 9.7.1]:
R
∗(V ) = {rV ∈ R(V ) : r(V ) = R
∗}
= {rV ∈ P (fˆR∗) : r(V ) = fˆR∗(V ) = R
∗}
= B(fˆR∗),
(4)
where P (fˆR∗) = {rV ∈ R|V | : r(X) ≤ fˆR∗(X), ∀X ⊆ V } is
the polyhedron of fˆR∗ , which coincides with P (fR∗) = {rV ∈
R|V | : r(X) ≤ fR∗(X), ∀X ⊆ V } [10, Theorems 2.5(i) and
2.6(i)]. Here, the polyhedron P (fR∗) is induced by the SW
constraints: the inequality r(X) ≥ H(X |V \ X) in (1) is
5The CO problem was originally formulated in [5] based on a study on the
secret capacity in a more general setting where a set of users A ⊆ V serve
as helpers that assist the active users in generating the secret key. The CO
problem considered in this paper is the case when A = V .
user 1
Z1 = (Wb,Wc,Wd,Wh,Wi)
user 4
Z4 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wd,Wf ,Wg ,Wi,Wj)
user 5
Z5 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wf ,Wi,Wj)
user 2
Z2 = (We,Wf ,Wh,Wi)
user 3
Z3 = (Wb,Wc,We,Wj)
Fig. 1. The 5-user system with V = {1, . . . , 5} in Example 1. The users
encode and broadcast Zis so as to attain the omniscience of the source ZV .
In the corresponding CCDE problem, each Wj denotes a packet that belongs
to a field Fq and each user i ∈ V broadcasts linear combinations of Zi to
help others recover all packets in ZV .
converted to r(V \X) ≤ R∗−H(X |V \X) under the constraint
r(V ) = R∗ in B(fˆR∗).
Problem (3) can be solved in O(|V |2 · SFM(|V |)) time by
the modified decomposition algorithm (MDA) proposed in [9,
Section V-A],6 which also returns an optimal rate vector in
R
∗(V ). Let P∗ be the finest minimizer that determines the
Dilworth truncation
fˆR∗(V ) = min
P∈Π(V )
∑
C∈P
fR∗(C). (5)
We call P∗ the fundamental partition, which is also returned
by the MDA algorithm.
B. Fairness
While the optimal rate region R∗(V ) is not necessarily a
singleton, the MDA algorithm, as well as [11, Algorithm 3]
[12, Appendix F] for solving the minimum sum-rate problem
in CCDE determine an extreme point (a vertex) in R∗(V ), as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. There are five users V = {1, . . . , 5} in Fig. 1,
respectively observing
Z1 = (Wb,Wc,Wd,Wh,Wi),
Z2 = (We,Wf ,Wh,Wi),
Z3 = (Wb,Wc,We,Wj),
Z4 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wd,Wf ,Wg,Wi,Wj),
Z5 = (Wa,Wb,Wc,Wf ,Wi,Wj),
withWj for all j ∈ {a, . . . , e} being an independent uniformly
distributed random bit. In CCDE, eachWj represents a packet
and the omniscience refers to the recovery of all packets in
ZV by users’ broadcasting linear combinations of Zis over
P2P channels [6].
By applying the MDA algorithm [9, Algorithm 1], we
determine the minimum sum-rate R∗ = 132 and an opti-
mal rate vector (1, 12 ,
1
2 ,
9
2 , 0), which is an extreme point in
6The efficiency of the MDA algorithm relies on the submodularity of
the entropy function H . SFM(|V |) denotes the complexity of solving a
submodular function. See Appendix A for the definition of the submodularity
and a brief note on SFM(|V |).
4R∗(V ) [9, Corollary 10], and also the fundamental partition
P∗ = {{1, 4, 5}, {2}, {3}}, which is the finest minimizer of
(5). It is not difficult to see that we can improve the fairness
of the returned optimal rate vector in R∗(V ). For example,
(1, 12 ,
1
2 , 4,
1
2 ) ∈ R
∗(V ) is fairer in that user 5 also takes part
in the CO instead of being a free rider.
The fairness considered in Example 1 corresponds to the
egalitarian solution [19], [30], which tries to make the users
have an equal share of the coding rates. The purpose is to
motivate them to take part in the CO. In a system where the
users’ contribution is unequal, fairness could mean that each
user should be penalized proportionally by the coding rates
he/she incurs in the CO. In Example 1, user 4 should transmit
more since he/she incurs the most coding rates for attaining
omniscience, even if the overall coding rates can be distributed
to the users more evenly (See Section V). This is another
fairness metric called the Shapley value in coalitional game
theory. These two fairness metrics are both studied in this
paper.
For a fractional rate vector rV , if K ∈ Z+ is the least
common multiple (LCM) of all denominators of ri, i.e.,
KrV = (Kri : i ∈ V ) ∈ Z
|V |
+ , this rate vector can be
implemented by K-packet-splitting in CCDE [11], [12], [17],
[31]: dividing each packet into K chunks and letting the users
broadcast linear combinations of packet chunks at rate KrV .
In Example 1, both (1, 12 ,
1
2 ,
9
2 , 0) and (1,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 4,
1
2 ) can be
achieved by 2-packet-splitting. Therefore, in CCDE, we are
also interested in determining a fair fractional optimal rate
vector.
III. DECOMPOSABLE COALITIONAL GAME
We formulate a coalitional game model in this section and
show the equivalence of the optimal rate region R∗(V ) and
the core of this game. The purpose is to introduce two game-
theoretic solutions, the Shapley value and egalitarian solution
in Sections IV and V, respectively, for attaining fairness in
R∗(V ). We also show the decomposition of this game model,
a property that will be utilized in Sections IV and V to propose
a decomposition method for obtaining the Shapley value and
egalitarian solution, respectively.
A. Coalition Game Model
Let the users in V be self-autonomous decision makers that
take part in the CO and assume that, instead of being selfish,
they may cooperate with others to form groups. We call X ⊆
V a coalition and V the grand coalition. Consider the function
fR∗(X) = H(X)+R
∗−H(V ). Here, R∗−H(V ) equals the
common randomness Λ in ZV that is shared by all users in V
due to the dual relationship [5, Theorem 1] [21]
R∗ = H(V )− Λ. (6)
Here, Λ is called the multivariate mutual information in [23],
or shared information in [22]. Assume that Λ is obtained by
a random variable ZU , which does not need to be broadcast
over the public channels. Then, the problem is how to encode
the remaining randomness in ZX given ZU for all X ⊆ V that
is measured by the Dilworth truncation [23]
H(X |U) = fˆR∗(X) = min
P∈Π(X)
∑
C∈P
fR∗(C). (7)
We call fˆR∗ the characteristic cost function in that fˆR∗(X)
specifies the upper bound on the (source) coding cost when
the users in X form a coalition so as to jointly encode the
randomness in ZX given ZU . The coalitional game model is
characterized by the user set V and the characteristic cost
function fˆR∗ . We denote it by Ω(V, fˆR∗). In this sense, the
game Ω(V, fˆR∗) formulates a multi-terminal data compression
problem where the users jointly encode the remaining random-
ness in ZV that is specified by the set function fˆR∗ .
Example 2. For the 5-user system in Example 1, the common
randomness Λ = H(V ) − R∗ = 10− 132 =
7
2 is obtained by
the random variable ZU . For users 1 and 2, we have
H({1, 2}|U) = fˆ13/2({1, 2})
= min
{
f13/2({1}) + f13/2({2}), f13/2({1, 2})
}
= min
{
H({1}) +H({2})− 2H(U),
H({1, 2})−H(U)
}
= H({1}) +H({2})− 2H(U) = 2
being the remaining randomness in Z{1,2} given U . The
interpretation is that, in order to attain the omniscience with
sum-rate R∗, the rate for users 1 and 2 to jointly encode
their observations is no more than 2 bits. Or, the maximum
cost incurred by users 1 and 2 cooperating with each other
is 2 bits of coding rate. One can show that (7) holds for all
X ⊆ V .7
B. Core
While fˆR∗ quantifies the maximum coding cost in each
coalition, each rV denotes a cost allocation method with each
ri being the source coding rate assigned to user i ∈ V . The
solution set of the game Ω(V, fR∗) is called the core [32],
[33] which contains all rV s distributing exactly the total cost
R∗ to individual users such that r(X) ≤ fˆR∗(X) holds for
all coalitions X ⊆ V . It is not difficult to see from (4) that
the core coincides with the optimal rate region R∗(V ), which
is nonempty [9, Theorem 4].8 In the rest of the paper, we
will refer to R∗(V ) as the core or the optimal rate region
interchangeably.
The inequality r(X) ≤ fˆR∗(X) in the core R∗(V ) also has
an interpretation in coalitional game theory. If a cost allocation
method rV results in r(X) > fˆR∗(X) for some X , the users
in X may break the coalition X and seek another rV such that
r(X) ≤ fˆR∗(X). This means the coalition X is not stable.9
On the other hand, if r(X) ≤ fˆR∗(X) holds for all X ⊆ V ,
then no user has the incentive to break the coalition V and
form a smaller one, i.e., the grand coalition V forms. In this
7An explanation of (7) can be found in [23, Section IV-B].
8The nonemptiness of the core R∗(V ) can also be explained by the
submodularity of fˆR∗ . See Appendix B.
9This can also be explained by the definition of stability [34, Section 4.3]
and the fact that the core is a stable set in [34, Theorem 8].
5sense, the core contains all cost allocation methods rV that
exactly distribute the sum-cost r(V ) = R∗ to all users in a
way such that all of them would like to cooperate with others
for the purpose of attaining omniscience [32, Chapter 12].
C. Decomposition
For any X,Y ( V such that X ∩ Y = ∅, let ⊔ denote
the disjoint union and rX ⊕ rY = rX⊔Y be the direct sum of
rX and rY . For example, for r{1,3} = (r1, r3) = (3, 7) and
r{2,5} = (r2, r5) = (2, 4), r{1,3} ⊕ r{2,5} = r{1,2,3,5} =
(3, 2, 7, 4). For X ⊆ V , let χX = (ri : i ∈ V ) be the
characteristic vector of the subset X such that ri = 1 if i ∈ X
and ri = 0 if i /∈ X .
For the fundamental partition P∗, each C ∈ P∗ defines
a subgame Ω(C, fˆR∗) with the characteristic cost function
fˆR∗(X) for all X ⊆ C. The core of the subgame Ω(C, fˆR∗)
is
R
∗(C) = {rC ∈ PC(fˆR∗) : r(C) = fˆR∗(C)},
where the polyhedron PC(fˆR∗) = {rC ∈ R|C| : r(X) ≤
fˆR∗(X), ∀X ⊆ C} is a reduction/projection of P (fˆR∗) on to
C. The following lemma shows the decomposition property
of the game Ω(V, fˆR∗).
Lemma 3 ( [9, Theorem 38 and Lemma 39]). The game
Ω(V, fˆα) can be decomposed by the fundamental partition P
∗
so that
(a) the dimension of R∗(V ) is |V | − |P∗| and
R
∗(V ) =
⊕
C∈P∗
R
∗(C)
=
{ ⊕
C∈P∗
rC : rC ∈ R
∗(C), C ∈ P∗
}
.
(b) The following holds for any rV ∈ R∗(V ):
(i) For any C,C′ ∈ P∗ such that C 6= C′, rV + ǫ(χi −
χj) /∈ R
∗(V ), for all ǫ > 0, i ∈ C and j ∈ C′;
(ii) For all C ∈ P∗, rV + ǫ(χi−χj) ∈ R∗(V ) for some
ǫ > 0 and i, j ∈ C.
The decomposition of the core R∗(V ) in Lemma 3(a) inter-
prets the decomposition of the solution set of Ω(V, fˆR∗) and
the fact that it makes no difference for the users to cooperate in
the grand coalition V or in subgames Ω(C, fˆR∗), ∀C ∈ P∗.10
Lemma 3(b) states that the costs, or source coding rates, can
be exchanged within a subgame, but not between subgames,
which can be explained by the dependence relationship in the
remaining randomness as follows.
1) Interpretation: Recall that fˆR∗(X) = H(X |U). Due to
the fact that P∗ is the finest minimizer of (5), we have
I(C;C′|U) = fˆR∗(C) + fˆR∗(C
′)
− fˆR∗(C ⊔ C
′) = 0, ∀C,C′ ∈ P∗ : C 6= C′; (8a)
I(X ;C \X |U) = fˆR∗(X) + fˆR∗(C \X)
− fˆR∗(C) > 0, ∀X ( C. (8b)
10This fact can be seen more clearly via the definition of the decomposable
game in Appendix B.
0
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
r1
r4
r 5
R∗({1, 4, 5})
P{1,4,5}(f13/2)
Fig. 2. The core R∗({1, 4, 5}) of the subgame Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗ ) of the
5-user system in Fig. 1.
Here, (8a) means that given the common randomness Λ that
is obtained by ZU , any two distinct coalitions C and C
′ in
P∗ have ZC and ZC′ mutually independent. That is, to attain
the omniscience with the minimum sum-rate R∗, the users in
C and C′ must encode the exact randomness H(C|U) and
H(C′|U), respectively. In other words, the costs or the source
coding rates cannot transfer between any two users i ∈ C
and j ∈ C′. This is the interpretation of Lemma 3(b)-(i) and
we call it zero exchange rate between i and j. On the other
hand, (8b) states that, given the common randomness Λ that is
obtained by ZU , any two users i and j in the same coalition C
are mutually dependent. In this case, the information amount
I(X ;C \X |U) that is mutual to X and C \X can be encoded
by either i ∈ X or j ∈ C \ X , i.e., the costs or source
coding rates can be transferred between users i and j: they
have nonzero exchange rate.
Example 4. For the 5-user system in Example 1, we have the
fundamental partition P∗ = {{1, 4, 5}, {2}, {3}}. The core
R∗(V ) has the dimension of |V | − |P∗| = 5 − 3 = 2 and is
decomposed as
R
∗(V ) = R∗({1, 4, 5})⊕R∗({2})⊕R∗({3})
where R∗({1, 4, 5}), as shown in Fig. 2, is a 2-dimensional
plane and R∗({2}) and R∗({3}) are singletons containing
single points r2 =
1
2 and r3 =
1
2 , respectively.
Given the common randomness Λ = H(V )−R∗ = 72 that is
obtained by ZU , any two distinct C,C
′ ∈ P∗ are independent,
e.g.,
I({1, 4, 5}; {2}|U) =fˆR∗({1, 4, 5}) + fˆR∗({2})
− fˆR∗({1, 2, 4, 5}) = 0;
for any C ∈ P∗, any two disjointX,Y ⊆ C such thatX⊔Y =
C are mutually dependent, e.g.,
I({1, 4}; {5}|U) =fˆR∗({1, 4}) + fˆR∗({5})
− fˆR∗({1, 4, 5}) =
5
2
,
i.e., in the fundamental partition P∗, we have zero exchange
rate between coalitions and nonzero exchange rate within a
coalition.
The decomposition property in Lemma 3 is useful when
considering the fairness. Since there is no freedom for the
6users who belong to distinct coalitions in P∗ to negotiate how
to allocate coding costs fairly, it suffices to just discuss how
to attain fairness within each C ∈ P∗. This will be further
summarized in Theorem 5 in Section IV and Theorem 14 in
Section V that allow distributed computation for attaining the
two fair solutions, the Shapley value and egalitarian solution,
in the optimal rate region R∗(V ).
IV. SHAPLEY VALUE
For an omniscience-achievable rate vector rV , it is worth
discussing how fairly it can distribute the source coding rates.
In the game model Ω(V, fˆR∗), fairness is also an important
performance metric of a cost allocation method rV in that it
promotes the users incentives to cooperate with each other. In
this section, we discuss how to attain fairness by searching the
Shapley value in the optimal rate region R∗(V ).
The Shapley value rˆ is defined in [20, Theorem 7] as a
unique solution in the core R∗(V ) with each dimension being
rˆi =
∑
X⊆V \{i}
|X |!(|V | − |X | − 1)!
|V |!
(
fˆR∗(X⊔{i})−fˆR∗(X)
)
.
(9)
Here, fˆR∗(X⊔{i})− fˆR∗(X) = H(X⊔{i}|U)−H(X |U) =
H({i}|X ∪ U) is the remaining uniqueness in Zi given the
ZX and the common randomness in ZU . The interpretation is
that, to attain the omniscience by the minimum sum-rate R∗,
if the users in X encode at the rate H(X |U) first, user i needs
to encode at the rate H({i}|X ∪ U).
In the game model Ω(V, fˆR∗), fˆR∗(X ⊔ {i})− fˆR∗(X) is
the marginal coding cost incurred by user i when he/she joins
the coalition X . Let Φ = (φ1, . . . , φ|V |) such that φi ∈ V and
φi 6= φj for all i 6= j be a permutation of V . Here, each Φ
denotes the order that the users join the grand coalition V , for
which, the total cost R∗ can be assigned to individual users
by the Edmond greedy algorithm [35]: For i increasing from
1 to |V |, we assign each user the marginal cost
ri := fˆR∗(Vi)− fˆR∗(Vi−1),
where V0 = ∅ and Vi = {φ1, . . . , φi} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |V |}.
The resulting rV satisfies rV ∈ R∗(V ). The Shapley value
rˆV is based on the assumption that all the permutations
are equiprobable. For each X ⊆ V \ {i}, user i will be
assigned the marginal coding cost fˆR∗(X ⊔ {i}) − fˆR∗(X)
for |X |!(|V | − |X | − 1)! out of |V |! times. Then, rˆV assigns
each user the expected marginal coding cost he/she incurs over
all permutations.
A. Decomposition
The fairness of rˆV can also be explained by its relationship
with the extreme points in the core R∗(V ). Let EX(V )
be the extreme point set containing all vertices of the core
R∗(V ). For a particular permutation Φ, the optimal rate vector
returned by the Edmond greedy algorithm is an extreme point
of R∗(V ) and EX(V ) can be constructed by applying the
Edmond greedy algorithm for all |V |! permutations of V [10,
Section 3.2]. Based on the definition (9), the Shapley value is
the mean value of EX(V ) [20]:11
rˆV =
∑
rV ∈EX(V )
rV
|EX(V )|
. (10)
Since the core R∗(V ) is decomposed by the fundamental
partition P∗ (Lemma 3(a)), we have the extreme point set also
decomposed as EX(V ) =
⊕
C∈P∗ EX(C), which leads to the
decomposition of the Shapley value in Theorem 5 below.
Theorem 5. For the Shapley value rˆV in the core R
∗(V ), we
have
rˆV =
⊕
C∈P∗
rˆC ,
where rˆC =
∑
rC∈EX(C)
rC
|EX(C)| is the Shapley value in the core
R∗(C) of the subgame Ω(C, fˆR∗).
Proof: For the fundamental partition P∗, since EX(V ) =⊕
C∈P∗ EX(C), we have
rˆV =
∑
rV ∈EX(V )
rV
|EX(V )|
=
∑
rV ∈
⊕
C∈P∗ EX(C)
rV
|
⊕
C∈P∗ EX(C)|
=
⊕
C∈P∗
(∏
C′∈P∗ : C′ 6=C |EX(C
′)|
∑
rC∈EX(C)
rC
)
∏
C∈P∗ |EX(C)|
=
⊕
C∈P∗
∑
rC∈EX(C)
rC
|EX(C)|
=
⊕
C∈P∗
rˆC .
Theorem holds.
Example 6. In the core R∗(V ) of the 5-user system in
Example 1, the Shapley value by the definition (9) is rˆV =
(54 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 3,
5
4 ). We have four extreme points in
EX(V ) =
{
(
3
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
, 4, 0), (
3
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
3
2
,
5
2
),
(1,
1
2
,
1
2
,
9
2
, 0), (1,
1
2
,
1
2
, 2,
5
2
)
}
such that rˆV =
∑
rV ∈EX(V )
rV
4 . Recall that we have the funda-
mental partition P∗ = {{1, 4, 5}, {2}, {3}} that decomposes
the game Ω(V, fˆR∗) as in Example 4. According to Theorem 5,
we have
rˆV = rˆ{1,4,5} ⊕ rˆ2 ⊕ rˆ3,
where rˆ{1,4,5} = (
5
4 , 3,
5
4 ) =
∑
r{1,4,5}∈EX({1,4,5})
r{1,4,5}
4 is the
Shapley value of the subgame Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗) as shown in
Fig. 3, rˆ2 =
1
2 and rˆ3 =
1
2 .
11In this sense, the Shapley value is the gravity center of R∗(V ) [20].
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Fig. 3. For the core R∗({1, 4, 5}) of the subgame
Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗ ), the extreme point set is EX({1, 4, 5}) =
{( 3
2
, 4, 0), ( 3
2
, 3
2
, 5
2
), (1, 9
2
, 0), (1, 2, 5
2
)}, the mean value of which is
the Shapley value rˆ{1,4,5} = (
5
4
, 3, 5
4
). We apply the random permutation
method twice as in Example 7. We randomly generate 3 permutations of
1, 4 and 5 each time and get the two approximations of rˆ{1,4,5} . In this
figure, the path to (1, 9
2
, 0) shows an example of how the Edmond algorithm
[9, Algorithm 3] finds the vertex (1, 9
2
, 0) corresponding to the permuation
(4, 5, 1).
B. Complexity and Approximation
The complexity of computing the Shapley value is expo-
nentially large in the problem size |V |, since the values of
fˆR∗(X) for all X ⊆ V are required to be calculated to get rˆV
in (9). What makes the situation worse is that determining
the value of the Dilworth truncation fˆR∗(X) for a given
X requires calling SFM algorithms and their complexity is
O(|X | · SFM(|X |)). Therefore, it is impractical to obtain the
exact value of rˆV in large systems.
One alternative approach is to utilize the decomposition
property in Theorem 5 to allow distributed and parallel com-
putation. For each coalition C in the fundamental partition P∗,
let the users in C obtain the Shapley value rˆC in the subgame
Ω(C, fˆR∗) by themselves; All rˆC are combined to form the
Shapley value rˆV of the entire game Ω(V, fˆR∗). By doing so,
the complexity is determined by the subgame of maximum
size Cˆ = argmax{|C| : C ∈ P∗}. However, the complexity
to obtain the Shapley value rˆCˆ in the subgame Ω(Cˆ, fˆR∗) is
again exponentially growing in |Cˆ|.
While the high computational complexity is an intrinsic
problem of the Shapley value, there are various approximation
algorithms proposed in the literature to alleviate this complex-
ity problem. For example, the random permutation method in
[36] utilizes the fact that the Shapley value is the mean value
over the extreme point set in (10). The idea is to randomly
generate a set of permutations of V of a desired size, e.g., |V |
or |V |2 permutations, and apply the Edmond greedy algorithm
to determine the corresponding extreme points, the mean of
which is an approximation of the Shapley value rˆV . This
approximation method can also be used in combination with
the decomposition method in Theorem 5.
Example 7. For the 5-user system in Example 1, we first
decompose the game into subgames Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗),
Ω({2}, fˆR∗) and Ω({3}, fˆR∗). For the subgame
Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗), we randomly select |{1, 4, 5}| = 3
permutations. For example, for Φ = (1, 4, 5), (1, 5, 4) and
(4, 1, 5), we can generate three extreme points, respectively,{
(
3
2
, 4, 0), (
3
2
,
3
2
,
5
2
), (1,
9
2
, 0)
}
( EX({1, 4, 5})
so that the mean value (43 ,
10
3 ,
6
5 ) is an approximation of
the Shapley value rˆ{1,4,5} in R
∗({1, 4, 5}). Note, different
permutations might result in different approximations. For
example, if we choose three permutations Φ = (1, 4, 5),
(1, 5, 4) and (5, 1, 4), we would have the approximation being
(32 ,
11
4 ,
5
4 ). See the two approximations in Fig. 3.
By combining the approximation of rˆ{1,4,5} with the ones
obtained in other subgames, we have the approximation of
the Shapley value rˆV of the game Ω(V, fˆR∗). For example,
the above two approximations generate (43 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
10
3 ,
6
5 ) and
(32 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
11
4 ,
5
4 ) that are the two approximations to rˆV .
In Example 7, we chose no more than |C| permutations
for each subgame C ∈ P∗, where the extreme point cor-
responding to each permutation can be determined by [9,
Algorithm 3]12 in O(|C| · SFM(|C|)) time. Therefore, the
overall complexity for approximating the Shapley value rˆV
is determined by the subgame Ω(Cˆ, fˆR∗) of maximum size
as polynomial time O(|Cˆ |2 · SFM(|Cˆ|)). Accordingly, if we
choose |C|2 permutations for each subgame C ∈ P∗, the
complexity would be O(|Cˆ|3 · SFM(|Cˆ|)). We also remark
that the approximation algorithm is not unique. In fact, there
are many other existing methods, e.g., [36]–[38], that can be
implemented to approximate the Shapley value rˆV .
V. EGALITARIAN SOLUTION
The Shapely value rˆV is fair in that it penalizes each user
based on the expected marginal cost he/she incurs in game
Ω(V, fˆR∗). For example, in the 5-user system in Fig. 1, user 4
incurs the most expected marginal cost fˆR∗({4}⊔X)−fˆR∗(X)
over all X ⊆ V \ {4}, the Shapley value rˆV = (
5
4 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 3,
5
4 )
in Example 6 assigns him/her the most coding cost.
However, this fairness suggested by the Shapley value
might not be the desired one in some practical systems. For
example, in CCDE where mobile clients are considered as
equally privileged peers, it is desirable to find a rV ∈ R∗(V )
that allocates the source coding rate as evenly as possible
without considering users’ prior knowledge of the source
ZV . Another example is a WSN containing a large number
of battery-powered sensors with equal initial energy budget,
where the even allocation of the source coding rate prolongs
the overall lifetime of the WSN. In these cases, it might be
more suitable to consider the egalitarian solution r∗V [19],
[30], the minimizer of min{
∑
i∈V r
2
i : rV ∈ R
∗(V )}. In this
section, we consider a more general quadratic programming
[39], [40]
min
{
g(rV ) : rV ∈ R
∗(V )
}
, (11)
12The algorithm [9, Algorithm 3] can be considered as a modified Edmond
greedy algorithm. See [9, Appendix B] for the explanation. In Fig. 3, the path
towards the extreme point (1, 9
2
, 0) is generated by [9, Algorithm 3] for the
permutation Φ = (4, 5, 1).
8where g(rV ) =
∑
i∈V
r2i
wi
and wV ∈ R
|V |
++ is a positive weight
vector which could have some interpretations in practical
scenarios. For example, wi could denote the quality of the
wireless transmission of user i in CCDE or the remaining
battery energy of sensor node i in a WSN.
It is shown [24], [25] that, if the function value of fˆR∗ can
be obtained directly, problem (11) can be solved in O(|V | ·
SFM(|V |)) time.13 But, determining the Dilworth truncation
fˆR∗(X) for a given X has the complexity O(|X | ·SFM(|X |)).
In addition, the minimizer of (11) may not be fractional or, if it
is fractional, may require splitting each packet into more than
|P∗| − 1 chunks in CCDE. Since |P∗| ≤ |V | and it is shown
in [9, Corollary 28] that there exists an optimal rate vector in
R∗(V ) with an LCM |P∗| − 1, it would be of interest to see
if we can find a fair optimal rate vector in R∗(V ) still with
LCM |P∗| − 1.
Example 8. Consider the minimizer r∗V of (11) for the 5-
user system in Example 1, we have r∗V = (
3
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 2, 2)
for wV = 1 = (1, . . . , 1) and r
∗
V = (
3
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
12
5 ,
8
5 ) for
wV = (6, 1, 1, 3, 2). While the former can be implemented
by 2-packet-splitting, the latter requires dividing each packets
into 10 chunks.
In fact, not only the minimizer of (11), but also the Shapley
value have the problem of incurring more than (|P∗| − 1)-
packet-splitting. For example, the Shapley value (54 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 3,
5
4 )
in Example 6 requires 4-packet-splitting, where 4 > |P∗|−1 =
2, and its approximation (43 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
10
3 ,
6
5 ) in Example 7 even
requires 30-packet-splitting. Such dividing and reconstructing
of packets could be cumbersome or even very impractical.
In the next subsection, we consider how to search for an
egalitarian solution in R∗(V ) that can be implemented by
(|P∗| − 1)-packet-splitting.
A. Steepest Descent Algorithm
For K = |P∗| − 1, let QK =
Z
K be the set containing all
rational numbers that are divisible byK . Consider the problem
min
{
g(rV ) : rV ∈ R
∗(V ) ∩Q
|V |
K
}
. (12)
The purpose is to search for a fractional egalitarian solution
r
∗
V with an LCM |P
∗|− 1. The objective function in (12) is a
separable convex function, for which local optimality w.r.t. the
elementary exchange χi−χj implies the global optimality. See
Lemma 9 below. Here, χi−χj denotes the cost/rate exchange
between users i and j in the game Ω(V, fˆR∗).
14
Lemma 9. In CCDE, r∗V is the minimizer of (12) if and only
if, for all i, j ∈ V and positive integer ζ ∈ Z++ such that
r
∗
V +
ζ
K (χi − χj) ∈ R
∗(V ),
g(r∗V ) ≤ g
(
r
∗
V +
ζ
K
(χi − χj)
)
,
13In the case when wV = 1 = (1, . . . , 1), the minimizer of (11) is also
called the minimum-norm point in R∗(V ), which can be searched by the
algorithm in [41] by polynomial time calls of the Dilworth truncation fˆR∗ .
14The optimization criterion in Lemma 9 is related to the discrete convexity:
The problem in (11) exhibits M -convexity on the real number set [42, Section
1.4.2], which also leads to the M -convexity on the fractional number set
of (12). This is essentially due to the M -convexity of a submodular base
polyhedron [42, Theorem 4.12 and Proposition 4.13]. See also Appendix A
for the definition of the submodular base polyhedron.
Algorithm 1: steepest descent algorithm (SDA)
input : a positive integer K = |P∗| − 1 and an initial point
r
(0)
V ∈ R
∗(V ) ∩ Q
|V |
|P∗|−1
output: r
(n)
V , the minimizer of (12)
1 begin
2 n← 0;
3 repeat
4 forall i ∈ V do
5 dep(r
(n)
V , i)← the minimal minimizer of
min{fR∗ (X)− r
(n)(X) : i ∈ X ⊆ V }; (13)
6 end
7 (i∗, j∗)← argmin{g(r
(n)
V +
1
K
(χi − χj)) : i, j ∈
V, j ∈ dep(r
(n)
V , i) \ {i}};
8 if g(r
(n)
V +
1
K
(χi∗ − χj∗ )) < g(r
(n)
V ) then
9 r
(n+1)
V ← r
(n)
V +
1
K
(χi∗ − χj∗);
10 n← n+ 1;
11 else
12 r
(n+1)
V ← r
(n)
V ;
13 endif
14 until r
(n+1)
V = r
(n)
V ;
15 return r
(n)
V ;
16 end
where K = |P∗| − 1.
Proof: The proof is based on a necessary and sufficient
condition for the minimizer of (11) for any convex function
g in [10, Theorem 20.3]: r∗V is the minimizer of (11) if and
only if, for all i, j ∈ V and positive integer ǫ > 0 such that
r
∗
V + ǫ(χi − χj) ∈ R
∗(V ), g(r∗V ) ≤ g(r
∗
V + ǫ(χi − χj)). In
CCDE, the entropy function H is integer-valued and R∗(V )
is fractional with denominator K = |P∗|− 1 so that the value
of fˆR∗(X) has the denominator K = |P∗|− 1 for all X ⊆ V .
Also, all extreme points in EX(V ) have the LCMK = |P∗|−1
[9, Corollary 10]. Therefore, for any rV ∈ R∗(V ) ∩Q
|V |
K , if
rV + ǫ(χi−χj) ∈ R∗(V ), then rV +
1
K (χi−χj) ∈ R
∗(V )∩
Q
|V |
K . So, Lemma 9 is the result of [10, Theorem 20.3] on the
set R∗(V ) ∩Q
|V |
K .
Lemma 9 directly suggests the steepest descent algorithm
(SDA) in Algorithm 1.15 Also note that, as an input to the
SDA, the initial point r
(0)
V ∈ R
∗(V ) ∩ Q
|V |
|P∗|−1 can be
searched by the MDA algorithm at the same time when the
minimum sum-rate problem is solved [9, Corollary 28(a)]. The
optimality of the SDA algorithm is stated below.
Theorem 10. For CCDE, the SDA algorithm in Algorithm 1
generates an estimation sequence {r
(n)
V } that converges to the
minimizer r∗V of (12).
Proof: Consider the recursive process
r
(n+1)
V = r
(n)
V +
1
K
(χi∗ − χj∗),
where (i∗, j∗) = argmin{f(r
(n)
V +
1
K (χi−χj)) : r
(n)
V +
1
K (χi−
χj) ∈ R∗(V ), i, j ∈ V }. This is a steepest descent approach:
15The SDA algorithm is also based on a discrete convex minimization
algorithm in [42, Section 10.1.1]. The difference is that we use a dependence
function dep to search the steepest descent direction.
9in each iteration n, we move from the current estimation r
(n)
V
in the steepest elementary exchange χi∗ − χj∗ by a constant
step size 1K . Based on Lemma 9, starting with any initial r
(0)
V ∈
R∗(V ) ∩ Q
|V |
K , the minimum of (12) is reached when this
recursion converges, i.e., when r
(n+1)
V = r
(n)
V .
For rV ∈ R∗(V )∩Q
|V |
K , consider the dependence function
[10, Sections 2.2 and 2.3, Equations (2.14), (2.15), (2.18) and
(2.19)]
dep(rV , i)
= {j ∈ V : max{ǫ : rV + ǫ(χi − χj) ∈ R
∗(V )} > 0}
=
⋂
argmin{fR∗(X)− r(X) : i ∈ X ⊆ V }. (14)
The last equality (14) states that dep(rV , i) is the minimal
minimizer of min{fR∗(X)− r(X) : i ∈ X ⊆ V }.16 A trivial
case is that i ∈ dep(rV , i). Based on (14), we have rV +
1
K (χi−χj) /∈ R
∗(V )∩Q
|V |
K for all i, j ∈ V : j /∈ dep(rV , i)\
{i}. So, for all iterations n of the recursion above, r
(n)
V ∈
R∗(V ) ∩Q
|V |
K and
(i∗, j∗) = argmin
{
f(r
(n)
V +
1
K
(χi − χj)) : i, j ∈ V,
j ∈ dep(rV , i) \ {i}
}
.
Therefore, theorem holds.
Remark 11. According to the proofs of Lemma 9 and Theo-
rem 1, if K 6= |P∗|−1, we could have r
(n)
V /∈ R
∗(V ) for some
iteration n in the SDA algorithm, or the estimation sequence
converges to, but may not reach exactly, the minimizer of (12),
i.e., the output vector r
(n)
V can be a suboptimal solution of
(12).
Example 12. For the 5-user system in Example 1, we
first apply the MDA algorithm in [9] and get the mini-
mum sum-rate R∗ = 132 , the fundamental partition P
∗ =
{{1, 4, 5}, {2}, {3}} and an extreme point (1, 12 ,
1
2 ,
9
2 , 0) ∈
EX(V ) in the core R∗(V ). By setting K = |P∗| − 1 = 2
and wV = 1, we start the SDA algorithm with the initial
point r
(0)
V = (1,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
9
2 , 0).
At the first iteration n = 1, we have
dep(r
(0)
V , 1) = {1, 4}, dep(r
(0)
V , 2) = {2},
dep(r
(0)
V , 3) = {3}, dep(r
(0)
V , 4) = {4},
dep(r
(0)
V , 5) = {4, 5}
(15)
Then, {(i, j) : j ∈ dep(r
(0)
V , i) \ {i}} = {(1, 4), (4, 5)}. For
r
(0)
V +
1
2 (χ1 − χ4) = (
3
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 4, 0) and r
(0)
V +
1
2 (χ4 −
χ5) = (1,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 4,
1
2 ), we have g(r
(0)
V +
1
2 (χ4 − χ5)) <
g(r
(0)
V +
1
2 (χ1 − χ4)) and, therefore, (i
∗, j∗) = (4, 5). Since
g(r
(0)
V +
1
2 (χ4−χ5)) < g(r
(0)
V ), we assign r
(1)
V = r
(0)
V +
1
2 (χ4−
χ5) = (1,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 4,
1
2 ) and continue the iteration.
16The last equality (14) is shown in [10, Equations (2.14) and (2.15)] due to
the min-max theorem [10, Corollary 3.4]. The minimizers of min{fR∗ (X)−
r(X) : i ∈ X ⊆ V } form a set lattice and the smallest/minimal is the
intersection of all minimizers. See [10, Sections 2.2 and 2.3] for details.
By repeating the same procedure in each iteration, we get
the estimation sequence {r
(n)
V } that results in the update path
(1,
1
2
,
1
2
,
9
2
, 0)→ (1,
1
2
,
1
2
, 4,
1
2
)→ (1,
1
2
,
1
2
,
7
2
, 1)
→ (
3
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
, 3, 1)→ (
3
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
5
2
,
3
2
)→ (
3
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
, 2, 2).
The recursion converges at n = 6, where we have r
(6)
V =
r
(5)
V = (
3
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 2, 2), which is the minimizer r
∗
V =
(32 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 2, 2) of (12) for |P
∗| − 1 = 2 and wV = 1. Here,
r
∗
V = (
3
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 2, 2) is a fractional egalitarian solution, a fair
optimal rate vector in R∗(V ), that can be implemented by
2-packet-splitting in CCDE.
B. Dependence Function
Based on (14), Lemma 3(b) and the discussion in Sec-
tion III-C, it is not difficult to see that, for all rV ∈ R∗(V ), if
j ∈ dep(rV , i) for any i, j ∈ V , then Zi and Zj are mutually
dependent given the common randomness Λ = H(V ) − R∗
obtained by ZU , i.e., I({i}; {j}|U) 6= 0, hence the name
dependence function. Moreover, due to the fact that j ∈
dep(rV , i), we can transfer arbitrarily small, but nonzero,
coding cost from user j to user i for encoding the mutually
shared information between users i and j, which is consistent
with the nonzero exchange rate in Section III-C.
In addition, we must have dep(rV , i) ⊆ C for the coalition
C ∈ P∗ such that i ∈ C, e.g., (15). This is because
I({i}; {j}|U) = 0 for all i ∈ C, j ∈ C′ such that C 6= C′ and
I({i}; {j}|U) 6= 0 for all i, j ∈ C, i.e., given the common
randomness in ZU , any Zi is only mutually dependent on any
other Zj in the same coalition C ∈ P∗. This will be formally
stated as the decomposition of r∗V in Theorem 14.
C. Complexity and Distributed Implementation
The SDA algorithm in Algorithm 1 requires oracle calls of
fR∗ , instead of fˆR∗ , which is equivalent to the entry of the
entropy function H and avoids the complexity of calculating
the Dilworth truncation. We derive the worst-case complexity
of SDA as follows. For any initial point r
(0)
V , the total number
of iterations of the SDA algorithm is
K·‖r
(0)
V
−r∗V ‖1
2 . Let
L(V ) = max
{
‖rV − r
′
V ‖1 : rV , r
′
V ∈ R
∗(V ) ∩Q
|V |
K
}
denote the ℓ1-size of the core R
∗(V ). The maximum number
of iterations of the SDA algorithm is
K·L(V )
2 . The mini-
mization problem (13) in step 5 in the SDA algorithm is
a SFM due to the intersecting submodularity of fR∗ [9,
Lemma 3]. Thus, each iteration of the SDA algorithm com-
pletes in O(|V | · SFM(|V |)) time and the overall complexity
is O(K · L(V ) · |V | · SFM(|V |)).17
Example 13. For the estimation sequence {r
(n)
V } generated
in Example 12 by the SDA algorithm, we show the error of
the estimation r
(n)
V in terms of the ℓ1-norm ‖r
(n)
V − r
∗
V ‖1
17The reason that the ℓ1-size determines the upper bound on the number
of iterations is explained in detail in [42, Section 10.1.1].
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Fig. 4. The error measured by the ℓ1-norm ‖r
(n)
V
− r∗V ‖1 of the esti-
mation sequence {r
(n)
V
} generated by the SDA algorithm in Example 12
to determine the fractional egalitarian solution in R∗(V ), the minimizer of
min
{∑
i∈V r
2
i : rV ∈ R
∗(V ) ∩ Q
|V |
|P|∗−1
}
. The error linearly decreases
to zero with gradient −1, i.e., the ℓ1-norm ‖r
(n)
V
− r∗V ‖1 is reduced by
2
|P∗|−1
= 1 in each iteration.
in Fig. 4. Since in each iteration of the SDA algorithm,
the estimation r
(n)
V is updated along the steepest elementary
exchange χi∗ − χj∗ by step size
1
K =
1
2 toward the optimizer
r
∗
V , we necessarily have ‖r
(n)
V − r
∗
V ‖1 decreased by
2
K = 1
each time. As in Fig. 4, we have the error ‖r
(n)
V − r
∗
V ‖1
being a linearly decreasing curve. In this case, there are
K·‖r
(0)
V
−r∗V ‖1
2 = 5 iterations in the SDA algorithm so that we
incur 5 · |V | calls of O(SFM(|V |)). In general, since the ℓ1-
size of R∗(V ) is L(V ) = 6, the worst-case complexity of the
SDA algorithm when applied to the 5-user system in Fig. 1,
is 6 · |V | calls of O(SFM(|V |)).
The SDA algorithm can also be implemented in a de-
centralized manner: let each user i obtain the dependence
function dep(r
(n)
V , i), a set of mutually dependent users given
the common randomness in ZU , by him/herself in steps 4 to 6;
the steps 7 to 13 can be completed by users’ communications
over the broadcast channels. By doing so, the computational
complexity incurred at each user is O(K ·L(V ) · SFM(|V |)).
D. Decomposition
Similar to the decomposition of the Shapley value in
Theorem 5, we also have the decomposition property of
the egalitarian solution in Theorem 14. We omit the proof
since it is a direct result of [9, Corollary 42], Lemma 3 and
Lemma 9(b).
Theorem 14. For r∗V being the egalitarian solution, the
minimizer of (11), or the fractional egalitarian solution, the
minimizer of (12),
r
∗
V =
⊕
C∈P∗
r
∗
C ,
where r∗C is the egalitarian solution or fractional egalitarian
solution, respectively, in the core R∗(C) of the subgame
Ω(C, fˆR∗)
Theorem 14 states that the egalitarian solution r∗V can
be determined by allowing the subgames Ω(C, fˆR∗) for all
C ∈ P∗ to obtain their own r∗C . This decomposition method
can be used in combination with the SDA algorithm so that
the complexity is reduced to O(K · L(Cˆ) · |Cˆ| · SFM(|Cˆ|)),
0
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
r1
r4
r 5
R
∗({1, 4, 5})
P (f
{1,4,5}
13/2 )
EX({1, 4, 5})
path to r∗{1,4,5}
r
∗
{1,4,5}
Fig. 5. By applying the SDA algorithm to the subgame Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗ )
of the 5-user system in Example 1 with the initial point r
(0)
{1,4,5}
=
(1, 9
2
, 0), we get the estimation sequence {r
(n)
{1,4,5}
} resulting an update
path toward the fractional egalitarian solution r∗
{1,4,5}
, the minimizer of
min
{∑
i∈{1,4,5} r
2
i : r{1,4,5} ∈ R
∗({1, 4, 5}) ∩Q3
|P∗|−1
}
.
where L(Cˆ) is the ℓ1-size of the core R
∗(Cˆ) of the subgame
Ω(Cˆ, fˆR∗) of maximum size. In addition, the users in each
subgame can run the SDA algorithm in a distributed manner as
discussed in Section V-C and therefore the complexity incurred
at each user is O(K · L(Cˆ) · SFM(|Cˆ|)).
Remark 15. Theorems 5 and 14 justify the exchange rate
resulted from the mutual dependence in Section III-C when the
game Ω(V, fˆR∗) is decomposed by the fundamental partition
P∗ into the subgames Ω(C, fˆR∗) for all C ∈ P∗: since
the exchange rate, or mutual dependence, is only nonzero
inside each subgame Ω(C, fˆR∗), we just need to let the users
cooperating in the same Ω(C, fˆR∗) decide how to attain
fairness.
Example 16. For the 5-user system in Example 1, consider
searching the fractional egalitarian solution w.r.t. wV = 1 in
Example 12 by the decomposition method in Theorem 14. We
first decompose Ω(V, fˆR∗) into subgames Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗),
Ω({2}, fˆR∗) and Ω({3}, fˆR∗). For the subgames Ω({2}, fˆR∗)
and Ω({3}, fˆR∗), we can directly assign r∗2 =
1
2 and r
∗
3 =
1
2 , respectively. For the subgame Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗), we apply
the SDA algorithm and get the following update path to the
fractional egalitarian solution r∗{1,4,5} = (
3
2 , 2, 2):
(1,
9
2
, 0)→ (1, 4,
1
2
)→ (1,
7
2
, 1)
→ (
3
2
, 3, 1)→ (
3
2
,
5
2
,
3
2
)→ (
3
2
, 2, 2).
See Fig. 5. Then, we get r∗V = r
∗
2 ⊕ r
∗
3 ⊕ r
∗
{1,4,5} =
(32 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 2, 2), the fractional egalitarian solution w.r.t. wV =
1 in R∗(V ) ∩Q52.
In this case, we still have 5 iterations in the SDA algorithm
and the convergence performance is exactly the same as in
Fig. 4. But, the complexity reduces to 5 · |{1, 4, 5}| calls of
O(SFM(|{1, 4, 5}|)). In general, since L({1, 4, 5}) = 6, the
complexity of the SDA algorithm when applied to the subgame
Ω({1, 4, 5}, fˆR∗), is 6·|{1, 4, 5}| calls of O(SFM(|{1, 4, 5}|)).
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VI. CONCLUSION
We established the equivalence between the optimal rate
region of CO and the core of a coalitional game with the
characteristic cost function being the Dilworth truncation fˆR∗
measuring the remaining information H(X |U) in ZX for all
subsets X ⊆ V given the common randomness in ZU . For
attaining fairness in the optimal rate region, we considered
the Shapley value and the egalitarian solution. The Shapley
value differs from the egalitarian solution in that the fairness
is attained if each user i is penalized by the expected marginal
cost or source coding rate H(X ⊔ {i}|U)−H(X |U) he/she
incurs if in coalition X . By utilizing the fact that the Shapley
value is the average over all extreme points in the core, we
showed that an approximation, instead of the exact Shapley
value, can be obtained by taking the mean over a desired num-
ber of randomly generated extreme points. We also proposed
the SDA algorithm for obtaining the egalitarian solution in the
core that can be implemented in CCDE by (|P∗|− 1)-packet-
splitting. We showed that the game is itself decomposable
by the fundamental partition P∗ so that, given the common
randomness, ZC and ZC′ for any two distinct C,C
′ ∈ P∗
are mutually independent, while Zi and Zj for all i, j ∈ C
are mutually dependent. This dependence relationship leads
to a decomposition method for obtaining the fair solutions:
the Shapley value and the egalitarian solution can be obtained
independently within each subgame.
The methods for searching the Shapley value and the
egalitarian solution in this paper require the solutions to the
minimum sum-rate problem, the value of R∗ and P∗ and also
an optimal rate vector in R∗(V ) to initiate the SDA. To further
improve the efficiency of attaining fairness in CO, it is worth
studying whether we can directly attain the fairness in the
optimal rate region without solving the minimum sum-rate
problem first. On the other hand, apart from the fact that the
egalitarian solution is more suitable to CCDE and WSN, it is
worth understanding to which scenarios the fairness suggested
by Shapley value applies. Finally, the fractional egalitarian
solution only determines a fair rate being assigned to each user
in CCDE. We still need a complete network coding scheme
that also specifies the coefficients in the linear combination of
chunks in each transmission.
APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES
A set function f : 2V 7→ R is submodular if
f(X) + f(Y ) ≥ f(X ∩ Y ) + f(X ∪ Y ) (16)
holds for all X,Y ⊆ V [10, Section 2.3]. A set function f
is intersecting submodular if the submodular inequality (16)
holds for all X,Y ⊆ V such that X ∩ Y 6= ∅ [10, Section
2.3]. B(f) = {rV ∈ P (f) : rV = f(V )} is a submodular
base polyhedron if f is submodular. For a submodular function
f : 2V 7→ R,
min{f(X) : X ⊆ V } (17)
is called submodular function minimization (SFM) problem.
We assume that the value of f(X) for any X ⊆ V can be
obtained by an oracle call and δ refers to the upper bound
on the computation time of this oracle call. It is shown in
[41], [43]–[47] that an SFM problem can be solved in time
polynomial in δ. The SFM algorithms proposed in [38][43]
vary in computation complexity. The exact completion time
of an SFM depends on the size of the ground set V . For
example, the SFM algorithm proposed in [48] completes
in O(|V |5 · δ + |V |6) time. We denote O(SFM(|V |)) the
computation complexity of solving the SFM problem (17).
A set function f is a a polymatroid rank function if it is (a)
normalized: f(∅) = 0; (b) monotonic: f(X) ≥ f(Y ) for all
X,Y ⊆ V such that Y ⊆ X ; and (c) submodular [10, Section
2.2]. It is shown in [49, Section 4.2] that the entropy function
H is a polymatroid rank function.
APPENDIX B
BACKGROUND ON COALITIONAL GAME
Due to the submodularity of fˆR∗ , the game Ω(V, fˆR∗) is
a convex game, for which the core is always nonempty [34,
Section 2]. This also explains the nonemptiness of the core, or
the optimal rate region, R∗(V ). The decomposition property
is originally defined for the convex games in [34], which
is consistent with the definition of disconnected submodular
system in [10], [50].
Definition 17 (Decomposable Convex Game [10, Theorems
3.32 and 3.38, Lemma 3.37]18). A convex game Ω(V, f) with
the characteristic cost function f is decomposable if
f(X) =
∑
C∈P
f(X ∩ C), X ⊆ V, (18)
for some decomposer P ∈ Π(V ) such that P 6= {V };
Otherwise, Ω(V, f) is indecomposable. For a decomposable
convex game Ω(V, f), the subgame Ω(C, f) is convex for each
C ∈ P .
Since (18) always holds for P = {V }, an indecomposable
game can be considered as convex game with the only decom-
poser being {V } so that the core R∗(V ) has the full dimension
|V | − 1 [34, Theorem 6(a)]. If a game is decomposable, it
must have at least one decomposer other than {V } and all
decomposers form a partition lattice, where the finest and
coarsest partitions uniquely exist [34], [51]. It is shown in [9,
Theorem 38] that the fundamental partition P∗ is the finest
decomposer of the game Ω(V, fˆR∗).
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